Chinese Foreign Policy & National Security Essay Example for Free

Chinese Foreign Policy National Security EssayThe chinaware- south Korea axis is perhaps the most everyplacelooked variable in the strategic environment of neon Asia. For nearly five decades their kind was characterized by war, lack of duologue and non-recognition then, over a period of some three years, this situation gave international to fully normalized and amiable traffic in 1992. Rapprochement between Seoul and Beijing in 1992 undefended one of the first frontiers of the post-Cold War thaw in the region, and future security will hinge at least partly on this core transactionhip. In this context, Cha analyzes the evolution of Sino- atomic number 16 Korean reconciliation, and argues that the reciprocal ohm Koreas fitting form _or_ system of government from the late 1980s in the political, scotch, and cultural ambits played a major part in eliciting strange cooperation from Beijing, however, its initiatives alone were not a sufficient stipulation to prompt this cooperation.A prior and necessary condition was a change in the strategic context surrounding China and the Korean Peninsula that raised twain the benefits of cooperation and the costs of non-cooperation the end of Cold War . In the context of security environment in compass northeast Asia, entropy Koreas achiever in engaging China has implications for future security on the Korean Peninsula. On balance, the axis is a stabilizing factor but not without its share of future challenges. With this in mind, the central questions of the article include (1) How does one explain the harvest-festival of cooperation between China and conspiracy Korea? (2) To what extent has Sino-ROK balancing been the result of successful strategies on the part of South Korea to engage China? (3) What are the implications on sexual union Korea?For a quarter-century after the Korean War, Sino-South Korean relations sat at the intersection of the global East-West affair and the Sino-Soviet split, making any hint of cooperation impossible.1 However, since the middle 1980s, Sino-South Korean relationship has moved from being sworn enemies and distant combatants in the Korean War, to being potential economic partners (but unagitated strategic adversaries), and fully normalized diplomatic relations in 1992. Three key drivers propelled the change in the relationship (1) the transformation of strategic environment attendee to the end of Cold War, which established the baseline for post-war interaction.In this context, Sino-Soviet reconciliation was a significant factor in Chinese calculations to normalize with Seoul. In particular, the end of Sino-Soviet rivalry reduced in Chinese minds the strategic consequences of losing sexual union Korea to Moscow, and made broadcasting to South Korea more feasible. Furthermore, in South Koreas view, China had evolved from being a revisionist causation to being a status quo one, in the degree to which Beijing emphasized unification or calmness maintenance as the security priority for the Peninsula. Unification was associated with Chinas radical power and keep for North Korea to subvert the South the essence of Chinas one Korea policy of the Cold War. On the other hand, peace maintenance implied constancy outcome for Korea by recognizing South Korea and opposing provocative acts by the North which might upset the insecure peace on the Peninsula.(2) Domestic change in China concomitant to Deng Xiaopings modernization reforms, and subsequent insularism of politics from economics. The initial economic trade was largely indirect, transacted through third-party intermediaries or South Korean duty firms in Hong Kong. By 1985, however, total Chinese-South Korea trade surpassed that between China and North Korea. During the 1980s, while the two sides still viewed one another as military adversaries, they increasingly recognized each other as economic opportunities. The beginnings of a diplomatic relationship too emerged in the mid-nineties with the establishment of trade offices between the Korea merchandise Promotion Association (KOTRA) and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in 1990, which facilitated shift from indirect trade to open and direct transactions, and subsequently in establishing formal diplomatic relations in August 1992.(3) South Koreas assured policy of fitting to elicit cooperation from China, in particular using non-punitive, non-coercive diplomacy and seeking mutual accommodation. South Koreas engagement strategy contained the hobby tiers first, economic linkages, investment and trade ties to increase the benefits to China of cooperation, and the costs of non-cooperation, providing contradictory capital and technology, separating political cooperation with economics, but gra bivalently produce cooperative behavior in other domains.The growth of trade ties in the 1980s was a major reason why China chose to participate in the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympics host ed by South Korea, which served as key event to normalize relations. Second tenet of South Koreas engagement strategy was to treat the opposing states perspectives as legitimate per se. This meant engaging Chinas divergent position into authoritative dialogues on the proposals for enhancing peace and stability in the region such as the Four-Party talks, and more importantly South Koreas recognition of One China Policy, acknowledging Beijing as the just legal government in China. These initiatives at the diplomatic front were followed by general increase in communication flows on the business, educational, and cultural trains to cultivate goodwill.In this context, South Koreas engagement strategy included the following goals (1) cultivate Beijings cooperation by tying Chinese national interests to stability on the Peninsula (2) improve South Koreas credibility in the international arena by enhancing its image as a regional player willing to reduce tensions and foster dialogue an d (3) engage North Korea through alternative channels. In order to pursue these goals, South Korea utilized the following manner in the macro-political perspective, the strategy of engagement of China was pursued through the policy of Nordpolitik and Globalization (segyehwa) which implied mutual economic prosperity as a operator of expanding diplomatic ties with former adversaries as well as assuming a leading role for South Korea in international organizations and the continued expansion of syllabus multi-directional diplomacy (i.e. using meetings of multilateral bodies such as APEC, ASEAN, non-governmental track-two diplomacy, high-level military exchanges). The second method of engagement has been sports diplomacy participating in athletic competitions hosted by each country provided a useful means by to express good will and interest in expanding the economic cooperation (Seoul 1988 Olympics, Beijing Asian Games 1990).What was the benchmark of success of South Koreas engage ment strategy? The key was not only engaging China, but too the terms of policy toward North Korea. The following measure could be used(A) Failure Chinese support of North Korea(B) Minimal Success 1.5 Korea policy formal support of North Korea and de-facto recognition of South Korea(C) get under ones skin got Success equidistance between North and South Korea(D) Very Successful discourage North Korean incitation and aggression(E) Most Successful China supports only South KoreaCha argues that the outcome of South Koreas engagement waterfall in the middle range (B to D). For example, Chinese behavior on the North Korean nuclear pick out in 1993-94, when Beijing sided with the US and South Korea on many aspects (such as opposing North Korea to repeal Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and abide to non-nuclear Peninsula), however, at the same time Beijing expressed unanimous opposition against any acts of coercion against the North. It persistently pressed for dialogue a nd negotiona as the only acceptable means of settling the dispute, and opposed any U.S. led sanctions thought the UN Security Council. A more successful outcome was the redefined Chinese behavior on UN admission of the two Koreas in 1991, in which Chinese accepted dual membership of the two Koreas in the UN.Arguing that South Korean engagement of China has been bugger offed, comprehensive and moderately successful, the next question is how this new relationship will affect security on the Korean Peninsula and end-to-end the broader region? Salient issues include the fix of the Asian financial crisis, the dynamics of second U.S.-North Korea nuclear crisis, the consummation of Bejing-Seoul dtente on South Koreas alliance with Washington, and the future challenges that could be posed by Korean unification.(1) The impact of the Asian Financial Crisis didnt affect China-South Korean relations thus far. In-fact, in 2003 China has surpassed the U.S. as South Koreas largest trading par tner(2) Sino-South Korean relations become important implications in understanding current relations between North and South Korea. Under Kim Dae Jung, South Korea initiated Sunshine Policy that rests on Seouls assurances of no-isolation, no destabilization, and no absorption. The Sunshine Policy is in many ways convertible to the engagement strategy toward China, both in form and potential success. In particular, it is consistent (despite Norths provocations) and designed to elicit cooperation from the opposing state.However, at that place are also differences- regarding intentions for cooperation to emerge, the opposing state has to be engageable. North Koreas behavior does not suggest she is open to an improvement of relations. Second, there are differences in South Koreas capabilities of early 1990s and late 1990s, in particular, in the early 1990s South Korea that engaged China did so from a position of relative strength and prosperity however, in the late 1990s, the Asian f inancial crisis put South Korean position to a relative weakness., because conciliatory gestures are more likely to be interpreted as appeasement rather than engagement. Hence success to engagement of North Korea is not likely.(3) Looking beyond the immediate North Korean nuclear problem, Korean unification raises a plethora of new factors that would test the resilience of China-South Korea engagement. The absence of the North Korean damp would give rise to a situation in which two powers with different regimes share a quick border. Another future challenges is on the economic front the rising China may hange its trade needfully and increase competition with Korea. A final potential conflict between a united Korea and China centers on nationalism, and the two-million ethnic Korean living in Chinese Jilin province, which a unified Korea might claim.In the final analysis, the dramatic transformation of Chin-South Korean relations in the 1990s represents the most successful role o f engaging China in East Asia. The lessons stemming from this engagement include (1) consistency- a policy can only be successful if it is applied consistently and deliberately, (2) engagement requires will and domestic political support to sustain the policy even in the face of little reciprocity by the other state (3) engagement applied from a position of strength conveys credibility, but applied from a position of weakness connotes appeasement. For the foreseeable future, the burden of managing the confrontation on the Korean Peninsula falls even more on the new China-South Korea dtente and the continuing U.S.-South Korea Alliance.My ObservationVictor Cha offers a plausible analysis of the South Koreas engagement strategy and the factors that have significantly improved Sino-South Korean relations, nonetheless, I would argue that he underestimated the historical factors that bind China and South Korea together, which might have accelerated the rapprochement on both sides. Traditi onally, Korea has fallen under the Chinese demesne of influence, with Korea belonging to the first-tier state of the Sino-centered worldview. In this context, another traditional binding element is the continuing anti-Japanese sentiments and mistrust in both Koreas and China that target Japanese sense of irresponsibility and demand apology for its war atrocities. taken together, I would argue that these factors also facilitated the relatively rapid transformation of the relations, on a personal level between Korean and Chinese officials.In the context of enhancing peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, confirmatory Sino-South Korean relations certainly play an important role. Both states are aware of this factor, and share similar interests. However, Beijing seems to be in a dilemma, it desperately does not want to face a crush of North Korea nor does it want to see a nuclear North Korea. Hence, Chinas actions in the foreign policy arena are still bound to the minimum neces sary level to ensure stability. Ironically, while the Chinese officials have been claiming that they are making efforts to persuade North Korea to enter multilateral dialogue and negotiation, they also claim that North Korea doesnt listen as it used to. In this regard, my question is How much leverage does China have over North Korea? 1 From the ROK perspective, during the Cold War China was part of the communist bloc, a patron of revolutionary regimes in Asia, and thus one of the primary threats to South Koreas survival. Chinas intervention in the Korean War in 1950, in conjunction with the July 1961 Friendship Treaty between China and North Korea with its automatic intervention clause cemented South Koreas perceptions of China as a threat. At the same time, Chinas hostility toward South Korea was equally intense. South Korea was the fascist axis of the iron triangle that included U.S. imperialism, and Japanese militarism.